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Comments
Allocation of Tax Payments Under Chapter 11
Reorganizations-Who Will Decide: IRS or
Bankruptcy Courts?
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental discord exists between the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice and the Bankruptcy Court over which one of them has the
final authority in determining how tax payments in bankruptcy re-
organizations shall be applied. Specifically, this disagreement cen-
ters on whether a bankruptcy court can require the Internal Reve-
nue Service to apply distributions under a plan of reorganization
initially to trust fund tax liabilities.' At the heart of this contro-
versy lies a dichotomy between payments made "voluntarily" or
"involuntarily" by the taxpayer.2 Traditionally under the common
law, a debtor in a non-bankruptcy situation was always permitted
to designate how voluntary payments would be allocated.'
Currently, there is a split among the federal circuit courts as to
whether payments made under a reorganization plan are voluntary
or involuntary, and as to whether such a distinction ends the in-
quiry.4 Thus, this issue is ripe for determination by the United
1. For a discussion of trust fund taxes, see infra, notes 6 to 13 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Amos v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 65 (1966). For a discussion of this case and
the standard for determining whether payments under a reorganization plan are voluntary,
see infra, notes 14 to 43 and accompanying text.
3. Amos, 47 T.C. at 68.
4. The Third, Sixth and Ninth Circuits, recognizing the traditional dichotomy, have
ruled that tax payments made pursuant to a bankruptcy reorganization were involuntary,
and thus, the Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter IRS or Service] was not obliged to ap-
ply such payments to trust fund liabilities first. See In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828 F.2d 199 (3d
Cir. 1987); In re DuCharmes & Co., 852 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1988)(per curiam); and, In re
Technical Knockout Graphics Inc., 833 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1987).
The First and Eleventh Circuits have looked beyond the traditional dichotomy. Having
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States Supreme Court, and indeed, certiorari has been granted in
In re Energy Resources Co.' This comment will focus on a brief
description of trust fund taxes, the historical test for ascertaining
when tax payments are voluntary or involuntary, an analysis of the
federal decisional law applying such standard and case law depart-
ing from the historical test, and some thoughts on how the Su-
preme Court might resolve the controversy.
II. TRUST FUND TAXES
Under the Internal Revenue Code, employers are required to
withhold from employees' paychecks an amount of money equal to
that portion of personal income taxes and social security (FICA)'
taxes owed to the government by its employees. 7 Section 7501(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code directs employers to place the amounts
withheld from employees' paychecks in a special fund "in trust for
the United States."8 These taxes are commonly referred to as
"trust fund" taxes.9 In the event that employers fail to pay these
"trust fund" taxes over to the government, section 6672 authorizes
the Service to collect a commensurate sum directly from the em-
ployees or officers who are liable for their collection and payment.1"
concluded that the bankruptcy court can order the IRS to allocate "involuntary" payments
to a debtor's trust fund liability first, these courts employ a balancing test, weighing the
likelihood that such allocation will increase the reorganization plan's chances for success
against the increased risk that the IRS may not collect the total tax liability. See In re
Energy Resources Co., 871 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 402 (U.S. Nov.
13, 1989) (No. 89-255); In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 823 F.2d 462 (11th
Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 108 S.Ct. 1724 (1988), on
remand, 861 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1988), dismissed as moot, 878 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989).
For a further discussion of these cases, see infra, notes 47 to 117 and accompanying text.
5. 110 S. Ct. 402 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1989) (No. 89-255). Oral argument on this issue has
been scheduled for March 19, 1990.
6. FICA stands for Federal Insurance Contributions Act. See I.R.C. § 3101 (1989).
The tax imposed under this section finances old-age, survivors, and disability insurance,
commonly known as social security. I.R.C. § 7501(a) (1989).
7. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, I.R.C. §§ 3102(a), 3402(a) (1989).
8. I.R.C. § 7501(a) (1989). Section 7501(a) provides, in pertinent part: "Whenever any
person is required to collect or withhold any internal revenue tax from any other person and
to pay over such tax to the United States, the amount of tax so collected or withheld shall
be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States." Id.
9. See Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1978).
10. I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1989). Section 6672 states, in pertinent part:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed
by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay
over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or
the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to
a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not ac-
counted for and paid over.
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These persons are usually referred to as "responsible"
individuals."
Thus, the effect of section 6672 is to make the "responsible" in-
dividuals personally liable for the unpaid "trust fund" taxes. This
consequence takes on a special significance when the employer has
incurred both trust fund and non-trust fund tax liabilities. In this
situation, the policy of the Service is to allocate payments first to
the outstanding non-trust fund taxes. 2 Then, if the employer has
insufficient financial resources to pay off the trust fund taxes, the
Service can tap the collateral source, namely, the responsible indi-
viduals, much to their discontent.1
3
III. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING VOLUNTARY TAX PAYMENTS
The touchstone for ascertaining whethertax payments are invol-
untary is the frequently cited test in Amos v. Commissioner.4 The
taxpayers in Amos had a substantial outstanding tax liability for
the tax year ending 1944.11 To collect on this liability, the IRS
served notices of levy on the taxpayers' bank and insurance com-
pany, both of whom complied with the levy.' Taxpayers at-
tempted to have the payments from the bank and insurance com-
pany applied first to the accrued interest portion of the
outstanding tax liability, so that they could receive a correspond-
Id.
11. See Slodov, 436 U.S. at 244-45. There is no corresponding personal liability for
non-trust fund taxes, such as corporate income taxes. In re DuCharmes & Co., 852 F.2d 194,
196 (6th Cir. 1988).
12. See I.R.S. Policy Statement P-5-60, reprinted in 1 Administration, Internal Reve-
nue Manual (CCH) 1305-15 (May 30, 1984). The position of the Service is reflected in the
following excerpt from the Policy Statement:
In determining the amount of the 100-percent penalty to be assessed in connection
with withheld income and employment taxes, any payment made on the corporate
account involved is deemed to represent payment of the non-withheld portions of the
liability (including assessed and accrued penalty and interest) unless there was some
specific designation to the contrary by the taxpayer. The taxpayer, of course, has no
right of designation in the case of collections resulting from enforced collection mea-
sures. To the extent partial payments exceed the non-withheld portion 'of the tax
liability, they are onsidered as being applied against the trust fund portion of the
assessment.
Id.
13. See supra, note 10.
14. 47 T.C. 65 (1966).
15. Id. at 66.
16. Id. at 66-67. Taxpayer husband held a group annuity contract with the John Han-
cock Mutual Life Insurance Company of Boston, Massachusetts, under which he was to
receive monthly payments of $523.40. Id. at 66.
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ing interest deduction under section 163.17 The Tax Court disal-
lowed the interest deduction, ruling that the payments received
from the bank and insurance company were involuntary.1 8 In
reaching its conclusion, the Tax Court looked initially to the com-
mon law derived from the debtor-creditor relationship.19 The Tax
Court stated the general principle that "when a debtor voluntarily
makes a payment to a creditor, the payment will be applied as the
debtor directs; and, if the debtor fails to make a timely applica-
tion, the payment will be applied as the creditor directs."20 Embel-
lishing upon this common law principle, the Tax Court went on to
hold that an involuntary payment includes any payment made to
the IRS as a result of distraint or levy, or from a legal proceeding
in which the Service is attempting to collect, or file a claim for,
overdue taxes.21
Several years after the Amos decision, the Service issued Reve-
nue Ruling 73-305,22 officially taking the view that a taxpayer is
free to allocate "voluntary" payments to taxes, penalties, and in-
terest in any manner he prefers.2" The Service also posited that
where the taxpayer failed to make a designation, the payment
would be applied to tax, penalty, and interest, in that order.2 "
Although Revenue Ruling 73-305 did not pertain to trust fund
taxes, the Service extended its, pronouncement to these taxes in
Revenue Ruling 79-284.25 In that ruling, the IRS permitted the
designation of "voluntary" payments in accordance with the tax-
17. Id. at 67-68. The taxpayers argued that they could direct how the payments should
be applied, that is, to interest first and principal second. Id. at 68. In the case of involuntary
payments, taxpayers alternatively argued that payments must be applied to interest first.
Id.
18. Id. at 69-70.
19. Id. at 68.
20. Id. (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 69. The Tax Court was guided by the Tenth Circuit's opinion in O'Dell v.
United States, 326 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1964). The Court of Appeals in O'Dell acknowledged
the general principle that a debtor who voluntarily pays his debts may direct to which items
these payments are allocated. Id. at 456. However, the O'Dell Court held that the general
principle did not apply where the payment was involuntarily made, such as in the case of an
execution or judicial sale. Id.
22. Rev. Rul. 73-305, 1973-2 C.B. 43.
23. Id.
24. Id. The Service specifically excluded withheld employment taxes from this Reve-
nue Ruling. Id. at 44.
25. Rev. Rul. 79-284, 1979-2 C.B. 83. Revenue Ruling 79-284 held, in pertinent part:
"Rev. Rul. 73-305 applies to withheld employment taxes and collected excise taxes where




payer's wishes, so long as the allocation was stated in writing by
the taxpayer.2 6 Revenue Ruling 79-284 further provided that where
the taxpayer failed to make the required designation, the IRS was
free to allocate such payments in accordance with its best
interests. 7
Thereafter, the Service attempted to treat any overdue pay-
ments made by the taxpayers as not voluntary.2 8 However, in 1983,
the Seventh Circuit decided Muntwyler v. United States,29 which
completely rejected the Service's treatment as involuntary the
mere filing of a claim.30 In Muntwyler, the taxpayer was an officer,
director, and majority shareholder of a financially troubled air-
line.3 1 Because of its failing financial posture, the airline failed to
pay its trust fund and non-trust fund taxes.2 The airline assigned
the entirety of its assets to a trustee for the benefit of its credi-
tors.3 3 The IRS presented a claim to the trustee for unpaid trust
fund and non-trust fund taxes.3 4 A short time later, the trustee
submitted three checks to the Service, directing that they be ap-
plied to the trust fund liability first.3 5 Although it accepted the
checks, the Service declined to follow the trustee's designation and
applied the entire amount to the non-trust fund liability.
38
The issue involved in Muntwyler was whether tax payments,
made pursuant to a mere claim for overdue taxes by the IRS, were
made voluntarily, such that the taxpayer was free to have those
payments allocated first to his trust fund liability. 7 In concluding
that the payments were volurtary, the Court of Appeals, relying on
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Falk, Designating Employment Tax Payments in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 30
TAX MGMT. MEMO. 299 (1989). The author noted that the IRS was able to successfully per-
suade two district courts with its position: In re Hannan Trucking, Inc. v. United States, 17
Bankr. 475 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981); and Hirsch v. United States, 396 F.Supp. 170 (S.D.
Ohio 1975). Falk, supra at 301 n. 27. Referring to the district court's observation in In re
Hannan Trucking, that "the power of designation, while absolute if timely, evaporates upon
the expiration or [sic] the relevant period for filing a timely return," the author commented
that the court's view was "extremely narrow and restrictive" and was "unnecessary, incor-
rect and unsupportable." Id.
29. 703 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1983).
30. Id. at 1033.
31. Id. at 1031.
32. Id.
33. Id. The trustee was appointed in a non-bankruptcy setting. Id. at 1033.
34. Id. at 1031.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1032.
1990
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Amos v. Commissioner, focused on the requirement that court ac-
tion or actual seizure is a prerequisite to a finding that the pay-
ment was involuntary.3 8 To support its conclusion, the Court of-
fered the Service's own policy statement 3 on the section 6672 one
hundred percent penalty assessment,4" which states: "The tax-
payer, of course, has no right of designation in the case of collec-
tions resulting from enforced collection measures. '41  The
Muntwyler Court interpreted "enforced collection measures" to
mean that something more than the mere filing of a claim for back
taxes is necessary to render a payment, involuntary.2
Finally, the Seventh- Circuit concluded in dicta that tax pay-
ments made under the auspices. of the bankruptcy court were in-
voluntary, since they involved court action.4" The Tax Court's defi-
nition of involuntary payment in Amos, and the clarification
provided in Muntwyler, have been relied on as established prece-
dent in the context of a bankruptcy plan of reorganization, as will
be shown below.
IV. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE INVOLUNTARY STANDARD
Because of the personal liability imposed on responsible persons
under section 6672, the voluntary requirement has generated sig-
nificant litigation for trust fund tax payments." From this litiga-
tion, two analytical approaches 'have evolved: a mechanical ap-
proach which simply looks at whether tax payments are voluntary
or involuntary; and, a balancing approach which, after making a
threshold determination that the payments are involuntary, weighs
38. Id. at 1032-33. The Muntwyler Court went on to explain that:
The distinction between a voluntary and involuntary payment in Amos and all the
other cases is not made on the basis of the presence of administrative action alone,
but rather the presence of court action or administrative action resulting in an actual
seizure of property or money as in a levy. No authorities support the proposition that
a payment is involuntary whenever an agency takes even the slightest action to col-
lect taxes, such as filing a claim or, as appears to be a logical extension of the Govern-
ment's position, telephoning or writing the taxpayer to inform him of taxes due.
Id. at 1033.
39. See supra, note 12.
40. The one hundred percent penalty assessment refers to the total amount of the
uncollected trust fund taxes for which-the responsible persons are liable. I.R.C. § 6672(a)
(1989). See supra note 10 for the text of this statute.
41. Muntwyler, 703 F.2d at 1033 (quoting I.R.S. Policy Statement P-5-60, supra, at
note 12) (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Falk, supra, note 28, at 300.
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the likelihood that the allocation will increase the reorganization
plan's chances of success against the increased risk that the IRS
may not collect total tax liability.' From a quantitative stand-
point, the majority of jurisdictions faced with this issue have fol-
lowed the mechanical approach." As will be shown, however, the
plain weight of numbers does not necessarily equate to the best
argument.
The court of appeals which initially adopted the mechanical ap-
proach was the Third Circuit in In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc.4" The issue
in that case centered on whether the bankrupt's payment of taxes
under a reorganization plan was voluntary. 8 The corporate tax-
payer submitted a plan of reorganization under which it sought to
allocate its payments of priority tax claims to the trust fund por-
tion of its tax liability.'9 The Service objected to the reorganization
plan, arguing that tax payments made pursuant to a bankruptcy
proceeding were involuntary, and thus, the taxpayer could not des-
ignate how they were to be allocated. 0 On the other hand, the cor-
porate taxpayer submitted that payments are involuntary only
when they are made under enforced collections measures which re-
sult in an actual seizure of property, such as a levy." Moreover,
Ribs-R-Us argued that since it did not lose possession of the assets
from which payments were to be made,52 the tax payments under
the reorganization plan were voluntary. 3
Focusing on the bankruptcy court's intervention in the payment
of creditors once a voluntary petition for reorganization has been
45. See supra, note 4.
46. Id.
47. 828 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1987).
48. Id. at 201.
49. Id. at 200.
50. Id. at 201. The Third Circuit stated the Government's position as follows:
[T]he plan provision directing the application of tax payments initially to the trust
fund portion of Ribs-R-Us' tax liability was intended to shield from potential per-
sonal liability principals of Ribs-R-Us,. . .who continued as the sole shareholders of
the reorganized corporation, and that because this is in derogation of the purpose of
section 6672 it is impermissible.
Id. at 201.
51. Id. at 202.
52. This reasoning follows from the fact that Ribs-R-Us remained as a debtor-in-pos-
session, continuing to operate the restaurant throughout the course of the bankruptcy
proceedings.
Id. at 199-200.
53. Id. at 202. Ribs-R-Us pointed out that under a Chapter 11 reorganization, the
"debtor retains considerable flexibility in proposing and implementing a plan, including the
amount and timing of payments." Id.
1990
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filed under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,54 the Third Cir-
cuit concluded that tax payments made pursuant to a plan of reor-
ganization were involuntary.55 In reaching this conclusion, the
Third Circuit considered the precedent set forth in Amos and
Muntwyler, and found the distinction between pre-petition and
post-confirmation payments to be crucial. 6 In this regard, the
Court stated that "following confirmation, the debtor is subject to
an express judicial order in a proceeding concerning the obligation
in which both the debtor and the United States are parties.''1 7
The Third Circuit went on to hold that classifying payments
made under a plan of reorganization as voluntary would fly in the
face of the realities of bankruptcy. 8 The Ribs-R-Us Court rea-
soned that in exchange for the protection of the bankruptcy court,
namely, to stay pending and future litigation and claims, and to
discharge most pre-confirmation debts upon confirmation of the
reorganization plan, the debtor loses any choice over how the pay-
ments under the plan will be allocated.59
The Third Circuit specifically rejected the position of the Elev-
enth Circuit in In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc.,60
which advocated leaving the allocation question to judicial discre-
tion, to be decided on a case by case basis. 1 The Court of Appeals
in Ribs-R- Us countered that whether tax payments made pursuant
to a bankruptcy reorganization are voluntary is a question of law.62
Motivated by an express concern for uniformity and reliability, the
Third Circuit felt a uniform federal rule was preferable to debtors,
creditors, and the IRS for guiding their decisions.6 3
54. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1982, Supp. IV 1986 & Supp. V 1987).
55. 828 F.2d at 203.
56. Id. at 201, 203.
57. Id. at 203.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 203. The Third Circuit relied on the opinion of the dissenting judge in In re
Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc., who stated:
Debtors who file under any chapter of the bankruptcy code have few, if any, options.
As a practical matter, they file bankruptcy because it is a last chance for a relatively
ordered financial liquidation or rehabilitation rather than the out-of-control financial
debacle facing them on the eve of bankruptcy.
68 Bankr. 463, 469 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (Volinn, Bankr. J., dissenting), rev'd. 833 F.2d 797
(9th Cir. 1987).
60. 823 F.2d 462, 465 (11th Cir. 1987). For the subsequent history of this case, see
supra, note 4.
61. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 202. For a thorough discussion of In re A & B Heating &





Almost three months after the Third Circuit decided In re Ribs-
R-Us, Inc., the Ninth Circuit followed suit in In re Technical
Knockout Graphics, Inc.6 The question for the court in TKO was
whether taxes paid after the debtor had filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy, but prior to confirmation of the plan, were voluntarily
made. 5 TKO advanced the position that the payments were volun-
tary for the reason that it had no duty to make any payments to
any creditors before confirmation of the plan.6 TKO further rea-
soned that since it made the payments without any obligation to
do so, the payments were not the result of any enforced collection
procedures and were prior to any intervention by the IRS in the
bankruptcy.67 The Service countered with the argument that be-
cause the payments were made during the pendency of the bank-
ruptcy action, a judicial proceeding, the tax payments were
involuntary. 8
Relying on the precedent established in Amos, Muntwyler, and
In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., the Ninth Circuit concluded that tax pay-
ments made after the initiation of the bankruptcy proceeding, but
prior to the confirmation of the reorganization plan, were involun-
tary.9 The Court held that TKO's attempt to distinguish its case
on the basis that it had no duty to make the payments when it did
ignored the safeguards created by Congress for debtors under a
"judicially supervised bankruptcy proceeding."7 Indeed, the Ninth
64. 833 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter TKO].
65. Id. at 801. The issue in TKO is slightly different than the question decided in In re
Ribs-R-Us, Inc., in that as to the latter, no payments of taxes had been made prior to the
confirmation of the reorganization plan.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The Government also contended that the bankruptcy court and bankruptcy
appellate panel erred in holding that the bankruptcy court had the power under section 505
of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 505 (Supp. IV 1986), to allocate payments among vari-
ous liabilities where equity demands, despite the involuntariness of the payments. Id. at
800-01. The Ninth Circuit in TKO agreed with the Service, finding that the Bankruptcy
Court had misapplied section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 803.
69. Id. at 802.
70. Id. The Ninth Circuit delineated the protections afforded debtors under the Bank-
ruptcy Code as follow:
Once a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the property it then possesses, as well as
funds acquired thereafter, become the property of the estate. The debtor-in-posses-
sion is not free to deal with this property as it chooses, but rather holds it in trust for
the benefit of creditors, just as would a trustee. . .By filing a bankruptcy petition,
the debtor enjoys the protection of an injunction barring secured and unsecured cred-
itors from pursuing the debtor without court intervention. A debtor-in-possession is
required to obtain the court's permission to make payments other than in the ordi-
nary course of business, and notice of this must be given to creditors. To approve a
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Circuit found that TKO had abused the safeguards of a bank-
ruptcy proceeding by attempting to designate payments in a man-
ner that benefited only the responsible corporate officers outside of
the probing eyes of the court or creditors.71 Thus, the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled that the IRS was entitled to allocate the payments re-
ceived from TKO in accordance with the Service's best interests.72
The third court in the trilogy to follow a mechanical approach
was the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in In
re DuCharmes & Co. 73 Essentially, the Sixth Circuit adopted the
positions of the Third and Ninth Circuits, in determining that pay-
ments made by a debtor in satisfaction of pre-petition tax liabili-
ties, after the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding, were
involuntary.? In so holding, the Sixth Circuit rejected the position
of the Eleventh Circuit in In re A & B Heating & Air Condition-
ing, Inc.7e
Numerous bankruptcy and district courts have followed the
mechanical approach employed by the Third, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits in determining that tax payments made in a bankruptcy
proceeding are involuntary.7e The lure of such a bright-line test
should be approached with caution, however, as it ignores the pur-
pose of a Chapter 11 reorganization, namely, the successful rehabili-
tation of the debtor corporation,77 as well as whether the risk to
reorganization plan, the court must find that the proposed plan is "fair and equita-
ble," meaning that the payment priorities of the Bankruptcy Code are met. The
debtor-in-possession is not free to pay whomever it chooses before the plan is con-
firmed, as this could defeat the priority scheme established by Congress.
Id. at 802-03. (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 803.
72. Id. The Ninth Circuit's decision in TKO has been followed by several bankruptcy
courts within that circuit. See e.g., In re Condel, Inc., 91 Bankr, 79 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988);
In re Stanmock, Inc., 103 Bankr. 228 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989); and, In re Puget Sound Ply-
wood, Inc., 1989-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9240 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1989).
73. 852 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1988).
74. Id. at 196.
75. Id. For a thorough discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's position in In re A & B
Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., see infra, notes 78 to 97 and accompanying text.
76. See In re Condel, Inc., supra note 70; In re Stanmock, Inc., supra note 70; In re
Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., supra note 70; In re 26 Trumbull Street, Inc., 96 Bankr. 419
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); In re Professional Technical Services, Inc., 94 Bankr. 578 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1988); In re Herald, 66 Bankr. 169 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1986).
77. A finding of involuntariness, which thereby causes the payments to be allocated
first to non-trust fund tax liabilities without a weighing of the interests, would negatively
impact the rehabilitation of the debtor corporation, as well as the general unsecured credi-
tors. The First Circuit illustrated how this would occur in In re Energy Resources Co. See
supra note 4. Essentially, the court supposed that certain responsible individuals would be
willing to advance the funds necessary to rehabilitate the corporation in exchange for an
686
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the IRS of collection of tax liabilities will actually be increased.
The balancing approach applied by the First and Eleventh Circuits
provides such an equitable weighing of interests.
The Eleventh Circuit parted company with the Third, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits in In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc,'
78
by applying a balancing approach to the issue of whether a tax-
payer could designate how tax payments should be allocated under
a bankruptcy reorganization plan.79 The facts and issue in In re A
& B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. were essentially the same as
those contained in In re -Ribs-R-Us, Inc., TKO, and In re
DuCharmes & Co., with one notable distinction: the IRS levied
upon the assets of the corporation prior to commencement of the
bankruptcy proceeding for failure to pay trust fund and non-trust
fund taxes.8 0 A & B Heating & Air Conditioning filed a petition for
reorganization ten days later.81
In its reorganization plan, A- & B Heating & Air Conditioning
included a provision designating that the tax payments be allo-
cated first to its trust fund liabilities.2 The Service objected to the
plan, contending that the tax payments made under a bankruptcy
reorganization were involuntary, and thus, the debtor had no right
to designate how the tax payments would be allocated. 3 The Elev-
enth Circuit, however, rejected the absolute rule that all tax pay-
ments made pursuant to a bankruptcy reorganization were
involuntary.8
assurance from the bankruptcy court that trust fund taxes would be paid first. 871 F.2d at
230. Although the responsible individuals would be released from personal liability under
section 6672, the corporation would be kept afloat by the influx of capital, which would
increase the likelihood of some payment to the general unsecured creditors. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit in In re A & B Heating and Air Conditioning also felt that "the
failure to allow the debtor to allocate tax payments [was] detrimental to the reorganization
plan," for the reason that if the responsible persons were forced to pay trust fund taxes out
of their personal assets, the motivation to continue to successfully reorganize would be re-
duced. 823 F.2d at 465. In that event, the Eleventh Circuit believed there would be little
probability that the general unsecured creditors would receive any payment. Id.
78. 823 F.2d 462 (11th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded for consideration of moot-
ness, 103 S.Ct. 1724 (1988), on remand, 861 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1988), dismissed as moot,
878 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989).
79. 823 F.2d at 465-66.
80. Id. at 463. The Eleventh Circuit appears to overlook the fact that a levy was
placed on the assets in its analysis of whether the court involvement in a Chapter 11 reor-
ganization rises to the level of court action equivalent to a seizure of property or money as
in a levy. Id. at 464.
81. Id. at 463.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 465.
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In its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit found weighty authority to
support the position that tax payments made pursuant to a reor-
ganization plan, as opposed to a straight liquidation, had elements
of voluntariness.8 5 In this regard, the Eleventh Circuit quoted from
the opinion of the Bankruptcy Court in In re A & B Heating & Air
Conditioning, Inc., which noted that a debtor under a Chapter 11
reorganization had wide latitude in developing a plan, and had sev-
eral options in determining how the IRS will be paid."" The Bank-
ruptcy Court concluded that because the debtor had a certain
"freedom" in propounding a plan, the payments made to the IRS
under that plan were voluntary. 7 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
cited precedent for the proposition that tax payments made pursu-
ant to a reorganization plan did not rise to the level of court action
which was the equivalent of "a levy, judicial order, execution or
sale." 8
The reason for the divergent opinions as to whether payments
under a bankruptcy reorganization were voluntary was, in the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion, due to a conflict between the public
policies of the Bankruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code. 9
In the legislative history to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Congress specifically recognized a conflict between the goals of re-
habilitating debtors and treating private, voluntary creditors
equally, and the interests of the taxing authorities, who are also
creditors to the extent of unpaid taxes.90
85. Id. at 464. In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., was decided by the
Eleventh Circuit without the benefit of the opinions of the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
in In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., In re DuCharmes & Co., and TKO, respectively. However, the
Eleventh Circuit did have before it numerous bankruptcy court decisions supporting find-
ings that the payments were both voluntary and involuntary. Id. at 463 n. 2.
86. Id. at 464 (quoting In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 53 Bankr. 54, 57
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd., No. 85-1552-Civ-T-13 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 1986).
87. Id. (quoting In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., supra, note 86).
88. Id. at 464 (quoting In re Lifescape, Inc., 54 Bankr. 526, 529 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1985)).
89. Id. (footnote omitted).
90. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5799-800. The Senate's concerns were specifically stated as follows:
In a broad sense, the goals of rehabilitating debtors and giving equal treatment to
private voluntary creditors must be balanced with the interests of governmental tax
authorities who, if unpaid taxes exist, are also creditors in the proceeding.
A three-way tension thus exists among (1) general creditors, who should not have the
funds available for payment of debts exhausted by an excessive accumulation of taxes
for past years; (2) the debtor, whose "fresh start" should likewise not be burdened
with such an accumulation; and (3) the tax collector, who should not lose taxes which
he has not had reasonable time to collect or which the law has restrained him from
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Acknowledging the responsibility of the IRS to collect all taxes
due, the Eleventh Circuit stated that public policy required that
the Internal Revenue Code be construed in such a way as to maxi-
mize the public fisc.9 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out
the intent of the Bankruptcy Code, which expressed a desire for
reorganization rather than liquidation.2 The Eleventh Circuit
went on to note that a successful reorganization plan results in
greater payments to the creditors, while preserving the economic
vitality of the corporation." The Eleventh Circuit held that al-
lowing the IRS to decide how tax payments will be allocated in all
Chapter 11 proceedings directly conflicts- with the policy of the
Bankruptcy Code. 4
For lack of any express legislative intent that the Internal Reve-
nue Code has priority over the Bankruptcy Code with regard to
the designation of tax payments, the Eleventh Circuit declined to
accept the position of the IRS, that all tax payments made pursu-
ant to a reorganization plan were involuntary. 5 Instead, the Elev-
enth Circuit ruled that the determination of whether a taxpayer
may allocate tax payments in a bankruptcy reorganization plan
was best left to the discretion of the bankruptcy court, considering
the plan as a whole and any equitable reasons for the allocation. 6
The Eleventh Circuit specifically ordered the bankruptcy court to
ascertain whether the proposed plan was "merely a stop gap
scheme" to prevent the allocation of the IRS while, in reality, little
chance existed that the debtor would be able to meet its obliga-









96. Id. at 465 n. 4 and 466. In particular, the Eleventh Circuit set forth the following
equitable factors for the bankruptcy court to consider:
the history of the debtor, the absence or existence of prebankruptcy collection or
"enforced collection measures" of the I.R.S. against the corporation and responsible
corporate officers; the nature and contents of a Chapter 11 plan (e.g., last resort liqui-
dation or reorganization); the presence, extent and nature of the administrative and/
or court action; the presence of pre- or post-bankruptcy agreements between the
debtor (or trustee) and the I.R.S.; and the existence of exceptional or special circum-
stances or equitable reasons warranting such allocation.
Id. at 466 (quoting In re B & P Enterprises, Inc., 67 Bankr. 179, 184 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1986).
97. Id. at 466. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion was eventually dismissed as moot, be-
Comments1990 689
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 28:677
The other major precedent advocating a balancing approach was
decided by the First Circuit in In re Energy Resources Co.98 In
that case, the First Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Court had the
legal power to direct the IRS to apply tax payments to satisfy trust
fund liabilities first, notwithstanding the fact that the payments
were characterized as involuntary.9 In reaching this conclusion,
the First Circuit employed a two-pronged analysis. 100
In the first part of its analysis, the First Circuit made a thresh-
old inquiry as to whether tax payments made under a reorganiza-
tion plan were properly characterized as involuntary.101 In its opin-
ion, the First Circuit felt that the characterization question was
difficult, in that a reorganization proceeding had some features
that made the tax payments appear to be voluntary,102 and others
cause the taxpayer agreed to delete from the reorganization plan the provision which desig-
nated that tax payments would first be allocated to the trust fund liabilities. 878 F.2d 1311.
The corporate officer personally liable for the payment of the trust fund taxes, who was not
a party to the bankruptcy action, paid off this liability from his personal assets. 861 F.2d at
1539.
98. 871 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 402 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1989)
(No. 89-255). This opinion addresses the consolidated appeal of two cases: In re Energy
Resources Co., 59 Bankr. 702 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986); and, In re Newport Offshore Ltd., 75
Bankr. 919 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1987).
Both cases involved reorganizations under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 871 F.2d
at 225. Both corporations were indebted to the IRS for trust fund and non-trust fund tax
liabilities. Id. The reorganization plan for each corporation applied the tax payments first to
satisfy the trust fund liability. Id. The Service lodged its usual objection, that payments
made pursuant to a reorganization plan were involuntary, and thus, only the IRS may desig-
nate how the payments were to be allocated. Id. at 225-26.
In In re Energy Resources Co., the district court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy
court which permitted the debtor's allocation to trust fund liabilities first. Id. at 226. The
district court in In re Newport Offshore Ltd. reversed the bankruptcy court's allocation of
tax payments to trust fund liabilities. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 227.
101. Id. The First Circuit reviewed all the relevant cases decided to date, including,
Amos, Muntwyler, In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., TKO, In re DuCharmes & Co., and In re A & B
Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. Id. The First Circuit also considered Revenue Ruling 79-
284, 1979-2 C.B. 83, as well as I.R.S. Policy Statement P-5-60. In re Energy Resources Co.,
871 F.2d at 227.
102. The First Circuit listed the following features which tended to characterize a pay-
ment as involuntary:
(1) Once a debtor files for reorganization under Chapter 11 all its assets vest in the
bankruptcy estate. (2) The debtor-in-possession (or other trustee) is no longer free to
spend the debtor's money; rather, he must act as a "fiduciary" for the benefit of the
creditor, and, he must act in accordance with orders the bankruptcy court may issue.
(3) The bankruptcy court will determine the extent of the debtor's tax liability. (4)
The debtor must produce a plan that will see that all tax claims . . . are paid in full
"over a period not exceeding six years after the date of assessment of such claim[s]".
(5) A bankruptcy court order confirming a plan is an order requiring the debtor (or
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that made it look involuntary. 10 3 However, the First Circuit re-
solved the question in favor of the IRS, holding that deference
must be given to an agency's own rules and regulations.'0 Since it
could not say that the Service's view was clearly unreasonable, the
First Circuit accepted the Service's characterization of the tax pay-
ments as involuntary.10
The second prong of the Court's analysis in In re Energy Re-
sources Co. centered on the power of a bankruptcy court to direct
the IRS to allocate involuntary tax payments first to trust fund
liabilities.'0 6 In concluding that the bankruptcy court was vested
with such authority, the First Circuit weighed the competing inter-
ests of the Bankruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code.' In
addition to the factors weighed in In re A & B Heating & Air Con-
ditioning, Inc.,'0 s the First Circuit also considered the bankruptcy
court's "broad equitable powers, '"109 as well as the legal power of
the bankruptcy court.'10
trustee) to carry out the plan, including, of course, its payment schedule. (6) If the
debtor fails to produce or comply, with such a plan, the bankruptcy court may con-
vert the proceeding, against the debtor's wishes, into a Chapter 7 liquidation, which
invariably will involve a bankruptcy court order requiring the debtor (or the trustee),
to pay assets to the government to satisfy tax liabilities.
Id. at 228-29 (quoting In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828 F.2d at 202-03) (citations omitted).
103. According to the First Circuit, the following features tended to label a payment
as voluntary:
(1) The debtor may choose "voluntarily" to enter a Chapter 11 reorganization pro-
ceeding. (2) The Chapter 11 proceeding offers the taxpayer protection from creditors,
including the IRS. (3) Chapter 11 gives the debtor many "options" for structuring
payment and considerable "latitude" as to "how and when the IRS will be paid." (4)
[T]hird parties . . . provided the money used to pay the IRS; no law or any court
order required these third parties to provide their money.. . (5) If a debtor fails to
produce an acceptable Chapter 11 plan, the bankruptcy court need not convert the
proceeding into a Chapter 7 liquidation; the court may decide simply to dismiss the
proceeding .... leaving the debtor back where he started. (6) Under historic bank-
ruptcy practice, a debtor can propose which of a creditor's several debts a particular
payment shall satisfy.
Id. at 229 (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 229-30.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 230.
107. Id. at 230-33.
108. See supra, notes 89 to 94 and accompanying text.
109. The First Circuit described "broad equitable powers" to be "those powers 'ex-
pressly or by necessary implication conferred by Congress.'" 871 F.2d at 230 (citations
omitted). The First Circuit also quoted from section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code: "The
bankruptcy court may 'issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropri-
ate to carry out the provisions' of the Bankruptcy Code." 11 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. IV 1986)
(emphasis added). In re Energy Resources Co., 871 F.2d at 230.
110. The bankruptcy court's legal power consists of the right to "tell creditors against
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Finally, the First Circuit gave consideration to the policy argu-
ments of the IRS."' To this end, the First Circuit noted that the
Service's policy of allocating payments first to non-trust fund lia-
bilities was based on an internal policy and not pursuant to some
statutory authority. 1 2 Yet, the IRS contended that section 6672,
which reflects a strong congressional policy to collect trust fund
taxes, would be frustrated if the bankruptcy court could tell the
IRS how to apply the tax payments.1 1 3 The First Circuit rejected
this argument, responding that the Service's preference of allocat-
ing payments to non-trust fund liabilities first ensured that trust
fund taxes were, in effect, paid last.' 4 The First Circuit found this
argument to be at odds with the purpose of section 6672.115
The First Circuit was unable to find any policy in any statute
implying that Congress felt that bankruptcy courts must augment
the probability that the IRS will receive its tax debt in toto, not-
withstanding any other interests, particularly the Bankruptcy
Code's preference for rehabilitation over liquidation."' After
weighing the conflicting interests of the Bankruptcy Code and the
Internal Revenue Code, the First Circuit found that whether an
allocation under a reorganization plan, which applies tax payments
first to satisfy trust fund liabilities, should be enforced, is a ques-
tion to be resolved by the bankruptcy court on a case by case
which of a debtor's several debts they are to apply a particular payment[.]" Id. at 231.
(citation omitted). The First Circuit further noted: " 'A court applies involuntary payments
according to principles of equity and justice, according to intrinsic justice or the equity of
the case, according to the rights and priorities concerned, or ratably to all debts, and in such
a way as will best maintain and protect the rights of all the parties.' (citations omitted)." Id.
111. Id. at 232-33.
112. Id. at 232.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. With respect to the purpose of section 6672, the First Circuit noted, in
particular:
In this way, the IRS's allocation policy gives ordinary, non-trust fund tax debts a
special status; it places the payment of "trust fund" tax debts at risk; and it effec-
tively forces the "responsible" persons to be liable for the last tax dollars due from
the.debtor, a liability which Congress did not say "responsible" persons ought to
have.
Id.
116. Id. at 233. The First Circuit noted that legislation proposed by the House of Rep-
resentatives in 1988 would amend section 505 of Title 11, United States Code, to read that
" '[playments of taxes under this title to a governmental unit may be applied by the govern-
mental unit in a manner that preserves alternative sources of collection, if any' ". Id. (quot-
ing H.R. 3984, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1988)). However, that bill was never enacted into
law. In re Energy Resources Co., 871 F.2d at 233.
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basis.'17
The holding in In re Energy Resources Co. has been followed
most recently by two bankruptcy courts within the Eleventh Cir-
cuit," and one within the Eighth Circuit. 19
V. POSSIBLE RESOLUTION BY THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A just resolution of this controversy mandates an examination
into the legal and equitable powers of a bankruptcy court. In delib-
erating this issue, the Supreme Court will need to define the scope
of a bankruptcy court's power. As a starting point, the Supreme
Court will probably look to sections 105 and 505 of Title 11,
United States Code, and the legislative history behind those
statutes.
Within the specific purview of Title 11, United States Code,20
Congress has conferred relatively broad powers on the bankruptcy
court to adjudicate all claims arising under Title 11. In this regard,
section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code gives the bankruptcy court the
power to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [Title 11]. '121 Section
505 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which specifically delegates to the
bankruptcy court the authority to ascertain the amount and the
validity of any claims for unpaid taxes, fines, or penalties relating
to a tax, which have not been previously adjudicated in a contested
117. Id. (citing In re B & P Enterprises, Inc., supra at note 92). The First Circuit
directed the bankruptcy court, on remand, to make the following inquiry:
[Ulpon consideration of the reorganization plan as a whole, insofar [sic] as the partic-
ular structure or allocation of payments increases the risk that the IRS may not col-
lect the total tax debt, is that risk nonetheless justified by an offsetting increased
likelihood of rehabilitation, i.e., increased likelihood of payment to creditors who
might otherwise lose their money?
Id. at 234.
118. In re Greenberg, 105 Bankr. 691 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); In re Gilley Consulting
Engineers, Inc., 105 Bankr. 734 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).
119. In re Educare Centers of Arkansas, Inc., 104 Bankr. 106 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
120. The scope of the bankruptcy court's subject matter jurisdiction is set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 157(b) (Supp. II 1984). Section 157 (b)(1) states in pertinent part:
Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core pro-
ceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11, referred under sub-
section (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject
to review under section 158 of the title.
Included in the definition of a "core proceeding" is the confirmation of reorganization plans.
28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2)(L) (Supp. II 1984).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (a) (1984).
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proceeding,122 does not necessarily address itself to allocations of
tax payments. However, the authority of the bankruptcy court to
confirm the plan of reorganization, 11 3 and the power conferred on
it under section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code,12' may provide an
alternative basis to the Supreme Court for affirming the decision of
the First Circuit in In re Energy Resources Co.
1 25
The Supreme Court is also likely to consider the competing in-
terests of the Bankruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code.
The lack of any express Congressional mandate elevating the In-
ternal Revenue Code over the Bankruptcy Code, which was a sig-
nificant factor in the decisions of the First and Eleventh Circuits,
may also weigh heavily in the Supreme Court's ruling. In the past,
the Supreme Court has recognized the necessity of granting broad,
equitable powers to a bankruptcy court in order to rehabilitate a
debtor, and has generally viewed the Service as any other
creditor. 126
VI. CONCLUSION
Shortly, the United States Supreme Court will decide whether
the bankruptcy and appellate courts must follow the bright-line,
mechanical approach taken by the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Cir-
122. 11 U.S.C. § 505 (a) (1984). Section 505 (a) provides in relevant part:
(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court may deter-
mine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or penalty relating to a tax, or any
addition to tax, whether or not previously assessed, whether or not paid, and whether
or not contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of
competent jurisdiction.
(2) The court may not so determine-
(A) the amount or legality of a tax, fine, penalty, or addition to tax if such
amount or legality was contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or ad-
ministrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction before the commencement of
the case under this title; or
(B) any right of the estate to a tax refund, before the earlier of-
(i) 120 days after the trustee properly requests such refund from the
governmental unit from which such refund is claimed; or
(ii) a determination by such governmental unit of such request.
11 U.S.C. § 505 (a) (1984). See also S. REP. NO. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6490.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2)(L) (Supp. II 1984).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1982, Supp. IV 1986 & Supp. V 1987). For a thorough discus-
sion of the bankruptcy court's power under section 1129, see Note, Bankruptcy Court Juris-
diction and the Power to Enjoin the IRS, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1279 (1986) (authored by
Deborah A. Dyson).
125. See supra, note 4.
126. Falk, supra, note 28, at 304 (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S.
198 (1983)).
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cuits for disallowing a Chapter 11 debtor's allocation of tax pay-
ments to his trust fund liabilities, or the more equitable, balancing
of interests approach taken by the First and Eleventh Circuits.
Should the Supreme Court choose the latter approach, its decision
would be amply supported by the various authorities discussed in
this comment. More importantly, such a result would effectively
place the decision in the hands of the bankruptcy court, which is
not only in the best position to adduce those facts pertinent to the
feasibility and success of the reorganization plan, including the al-
location of tax payments, but which also appears to have been
vested with the power to do so.
Carol L. Starr

